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 
Abstract— Security features are getting a growing interest in 
microelectronics. Not only entities have to authenticate in the 
context of a high secure communication but also the hardware 
employed has to be trusted. Silicon Physical Unclonable 
Functions (PUFs) or Physical Random Functions, which exploits 
manufacturing process variations in integrated circuits, have 
been used to authenticate the hardware in which they are 
included and, based on them, several cryptographic protocols 
have been reported. This paper describes the hardware 
implementation of a symmetric-key authentication protocol in 
which a PUF is one of the relevant blocks. The second relevant 
block is a SHA-3 2nd round candidate, a Secure Hash Algorithm 
(in particular Keccak), which has been proposed to replace the 
SHA-2 functions that have been broken no long time ago. 
Implementation details are discussed in the case of Xilinx FPGAs. 
 
Index Terms— Hash function, lightweight protocol, physically 
unclonable function, true random number generator. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
EVERAL protocols have been proposed based on 
symmetric and asymmetric cryptography that use PUFs in 
order to improve security features. Most of them are ad-
hoc structures that depend on the application, such as the 
symmetric key protocol for IP protection proposed in [1], and 
the structure for off-line RFID authentication described in [2], 
which uses elliptic curve-based asymmetric cryptography. 
Symmetric key constructions offer simpler structures than 
asymmetric ones. This fact, together with using PUFs, which 
provide tamper resistant authentication and protection against 
reply attacks at low cost, allow the implementation of secure 
symmetric key constructions with low hardware resources, 
what is known as lightweight cryptography.  This is the 
approach followed by the HB-PUF protocol in [3] and the 
proposal in [4]. 
Our proposal is to implement a challenge–response Diffie-
Helman authentication protocol [5] with the following building 
blocks so as to obtain a lightweight and secure solution: (a) 
ring oscillator-based PUFs (Physical Unclonable Functions) for 
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dynamic key generation, (b) ring oscillators working as TRNG 
(true random number generators) to generate the protocol 
nonces, and (c) SHA3 2nd round candidates of the NIST 
(concretely Keccak) for hash function. Security relies in the 
secrecy of the key (which is generated on the fly), randomness 
of the nonces, and use of hash functions. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section II gives an 
overview of the protocol characteristics. Section III reviews, 
firstly, basic principles of PUFs and focuses, secondly, on 
structures for secret key generation using fuzzy extractor and 
ring oscillator PUFs. Section IV describes ring oscillator 
configurations to construct TRNGs while Section V describes 
the features of the hash function used. All implementation 
results are summarized in Section VI. Finally, conclusions are 
given in Section VII. 
II. AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL 
Figure 1 shows the generic scheme of our proposal based 
on Diffie-Helman protocol. To ensure privacy and integrity, 
the protocol uses a symmetric key scheme and hashes the 
responses of each side before being sent. The working 
principle is as follows:  
 Each extreme generates a token (nonce) that must be 
sent to the extreme under authentication. Nonces will 
be generated by TRNGs to avoid replay and 
dictionary attacks. 
 The receiver extreme generates a response that 
depends on both nonces and the common secret key. 
In order to avoid side channel attacks, key is 
dynamically generated by a PUF.   
 Responses are hashed before being sent to ensure 
secrecy of the key. The response received by each 
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extreme is compared with the value calculated so as 
to decide authentication.  
III. PUFS FOR SECRET KEY GENERATION 
PUFs, which were introduced by Pappu in [6], are random 
functions driven by parametric properties of physical 
components that map a set of challenges to a set of responses. 
The mapping function can only be evaluated with the physical 
system. Pappu defined a PUF as a physical object with special 
properties of unclonability (both physically and 
mathematically) and unpredictability [6]. Ideally, difference 
between two responses of different PUFs to the same 
challenge show Hamming variation of µ=50% with σ=0% 
(PUF uniqueness property), and difference between two 
responses of the same PUF to the same challenge, shows 
ideally Hamming variation of µ=0% with σ=0% (PUF 
reliability property). 
PUFs can be divided into two groups: those that require 
special fabrication steps (such as Active Coating [7] and 
Optical structures [8]) and those denominated Silicon PUFs 
[9], which can be implemented in standard FPGAs and ASICs. 
The latter are cheaper and easier to implement while keeping 
good values of uniqueness and reliability. They exploit small 
variations in the integrated circuit manufacturing process, 
which translate into different start-up values for cross-coupled 
structures, and different leakage currents or delays for different 
realizations of the same circuit [10]. Delay PUFs are the most 
common due to its simplicity and flexibility. Existing delay 
PUFs are: arbiter [11], tristate buffer [12], and ring oscillator 
(RO) PUFs [11]. Among them, ring oscillator PUFs are the 
best option concerning uniqueness and reliability [10]. Each bit 
response is generated by the comparison of two ring oscillator 
frequencies, where the chosen ring oscillator pair is determined 
by the challenge. 
PUFs are a good option for dynamically generating secret 
keys. However, due to noise, when a PUF is driven by the 
same challenge, a noisy version of the recorded response is 
obtained. To cope with this problem, helper data or fuzzy 
extractor algorithms are the most used schemes [13]-[14]. The 
basic scheme of fuzzy extractor algorithms consists of the 
following two phases: 
Enrollment: The helper data, W (public), is generated 
from the PUF response added to one codeword c (private), 
which has been chosen randomly from a code C.  
Key reconstruction: This phase consists of two steps 
named ‘information reconciliation’ and ‘privacy 
amplification’. In the first step, the PUF is challenged as in the 
enrollment, now obtaining a probably noisy response, R’. This 
output is subtracted to the helper data (usually XOR(W,R’) is 
used) and the result goes through an error correcting code 
(ECC) decoding to recover the codeword c. From c, the 
original PUF response, R, can be reconstructed (R = 
XOR(W,c)). In the ‘privacy amplification’ step, a hash 
function is used to generate the key so as to provide well 
randomness. 
Figure 2 shows a scheme of key generation using PUFs 
and fuzzy extractor. 
As mentioned above, noise should be removed from PUFs 
to make key repeatable. For this purpose, Guajardo et al. in [1] 
proposed the use of binary BCH codes for SRAM PUFs. 
However, BCH requirements in these applications become 
complex, heavy and time cost.  Bösch et al. in [13] introduced 
the idea of using combined codes (for example BCH and 
repetition codes) obtaining reductions of even 70% of 
necessary source bits. Another approach, like the one in [15], 
faces the problem from the perspective of using soft decision. 
These approaches reduce hardware requirements but at the cost 
of increasing the complexity of the system. 
Instead of adding postprocessing, Maiti et al. in [16] 
proposed to address the problem of noise when designing the 
PUF. The idea is to compare the “right”couples of oscillators, 
that is, choosing those rings whose   difference in frequency is 
reliable (the challenge is the variable that selects the couple). 
Using this approach, results in [16] show no variation of the 
PUF response with temperature, and a constant value of 4 
unstable bits due to voltage variations  (independently of the 
ring oscillators employed). This means that it is possible for 
ring oscillator PUFs to generate keys without using error 
correcting codes. Using this scheme, N ring oscillators are 
required to generate N-1 independent bits. 
The PUF selected in this work is the structure proposed in 
[16]. The number of ring oscillators used is 33 to generate a 32 
bit response. To ensure correcting any possibly small error in 
the PUF response, a repetition code R(3,1) has been selected. 
IV. TRNG IMPLEMENTATION 
Since nonces must be as random and not repeatable as 
possible, TRNGs should be employed. Our election is the use 
of ring oscillators-based TRNGs due to its simplicity (digital 
approach and simple harvesting mechanism) and the 
advantage of using the same basic elements employed by the 
key generating structure, which allows obtaining a compact 
 
 




Figure 3. TRNG using ring oscillators 
and efficient design because ring oscillators can be shared by 
both structures. 
TRNGs that use ring oscillators are based on sampling 
phase jitter in the output of oscillator rings. They were first 
introduced by Sunar et al. in [17]. That proposal contained 
114 ring oscillator (each of them with 13 inverters) and 
processed the output with a resilient function (implemented as 
a BCH code) to increase the entropy and remove bias from the 
random signal. Schellekens et al. in [18] employ the same 
construction as in [17], but using 210 ring oscillators with 3 
inverters. Alioto et al. in [19] and Wold et al. in [20] 
suggested an enhancement by adding an extra D flip-flop after 
each ring instead of using the BCH post-processing stage 
(Figure 3). Alioto et al. confirmed with experimental results of 
implementations in different FPGAs and within the same 
FPGA that degree of randomness is essentially unaffected by 
process variations. Wold et al. [20] reduced the number of 
inverters per ring to 3 (Figure 3) because their experimental 
results showed dispersion decreases with ring length. They 
studied that structures with 25 and 50 rings passed NIST and 
DIEHARD tests. These results were confirmed (and extended 
to consider restart test) by Maiti et al. for structures from 32 to 
128 rings [21]. Alioto described the probability of truly 
randomness, Prand, of the sampled value for a group of n ring 
oscillators as [19]: 
      Prand=૚ െ ሾ૚ െ ܕܑ ܖ ൭૛
ોܒ,܋ܡ܋ܔ܍ට۴ܗܛ܋۴ܛ
܂ܗܛ܋ , ૚൱ሿn   (1)  
Where the ratio  ોܒ,܋ܡ܋ܔ܍܂ܗܛ܋   (between the standard deviation of 
the cycle-to-cycle jitter and the oscillator period) is 
independent of the number of inverters and has a typical value 
around 2% [19]. Hence, randomness increases by increasing 
the oscillator frequency, Fosc (that is, by reducing the number of 
inverters), by increasing the number of rings oscillators, and by 
reducing the sampling frequency of D flip-flops, Fs. The latter 
determines the throughput of the TRNG, so that its selection 
becomes a trade-off between randomness and bit rate.  
The TRNG selected in this work is the scheme proposed in 
[20] and tested in [21], which uses three inverters per ring. 
Minimal number of oscillators needed is 25 but as increase of 
ring oscillators increase randomness and the selected PUF 
construction require 33, we would reuse these 33 ring 
oscillators to build the TRNG. 
V. HASH SELECTION 
Along last decades, several attacks have broken the hash 
functions available. The early DES function was replaced by 
SHA-1 in 1995, while SHA-1 was replaced by the SHA-2 
hash family in 2002. However, SHA-2 has also been broken 
no long time ago. This is why the NIST (National Institute of 
Standards) opened a public competition to develop a new 
cryptographic hash algorithm still competitive in area and 
performance. The resulting algorithm will be called “SHA-3”. 
The competition is in its second round stage. Comparison 
between all second round SHA-3 candidates in terms of area 
and throughput [22] points at Keccak as the possessor of a 
good trade-off between throughput and area while keeping 
good security features. 
Keccak is a cryptographic hash family based on sponge 
functions [23]. Any instance of the Keccak function makes use 
of one of the seven Keccak-f permutations, denoted Keccak-
f[b], where b is the width of the permutation. These 
permutations are iterated constructions consisting of a 
sequence of rounds, where each round implements five 
invertible steps. Keccak function is defined by a set of 
parameters that are related among them: 
 b: width permutation (equal to 25, 50, 100,  200,  
400, 800, or 1600)  
 n: length of the output message 
 c: capacity, limited by c < b. Choosing a c value 
higher  than  2n avoids generic attacks with  
complexity below 2n. 
 r: rate, should be a power of 2 and fulfill: r=b-c  
 nr: number of rounds in Keccak-f. nr = 12 + 2*l, with 
w=2l = b/25.  
      Our selection for the hash function has been 
Keccak[b=400] as it is the minimum permutation size that 
allows an output message (n) of 128 bits with enough security. 
In this case, the selected values for the basic parameters are: 
n=128, b=400, c=272, r=128 and nr =20. This construction is 
employed in the fuzzy extractor scheme for generating the 
secret key, and in the protocol to generate the response of each 
side under authentication.  
VI. RESULTS 
The described scheme has been analyzed considering an 
FPGA Xilinx Spartan XC3S500E as the target device. 
Based on the work in [21], PUF and TRNG circuits have 
been merged using 33 (fixed by PUF requirements) ring 
oscillator blocks. They are shared avoiding unnecessary 
hardware duplication and power dissipation. The number of 
inverters per ring depends on the operation mode, being three 
in the case of nonce generation, and five [16] in the case of 
PUF operation. Ring oscillator blocks and the complete PUF-
TRNG module are shown in Figure 4. 
Nonce size chosen is 48 bits. The TRNG structure takes 
around 2 cycles of the sampling frequency (fs) plus another 
clock system cycle to generate one bit. This results in a total of 
96 sampling frequency cycles plus 48 clock system cycles to 
generate a nonce. Since maximum Fs is 50MHz in the target 
device, required time for nonce generation becomes 2.88s. 
Key size selected is 128 bits. It results from hashing with 
Keccak[400] a 32 bit stream provided by the ring oscillator 
PUF. The PUF-TRNG module takes around 3 clock system 
cycles per bit, what makes a total of around 96 clock cycles to 
provide 32 bits.  Using a repetition code R(3,1) to improve 
reliability means that 3 bits are generated for each required 
key bit. Hence, time is triplicated, resulting in 288 system 
clock cycles that, at 50MHz, becomes 5.76 s. 
The high-speed core approach of Keccak has been 
implemented [24]. Assuming that the input buffer of Keccak 
[400] is full, 20 clock cycles are required to obtain an output 
of 128 bits. Presuming 5 clock cycles to fill the buffer, then 
latency is less than 25 clock cycles, which results in a total of 
500ns for a 50MHz system clock.  
Complete procedure of key generation requires hashing of 
PUF response, so that it takes around 6.26 s (5.76 s plus 
500ns of hashing). 
Challenges of the PUF consist of five bits for each ring 
oscillator, which requires a RAM of 33 words of 5 bits.  
Responses are formed by hashing the concatenation of two 
nonces and the secret key obtained from the PUF response. 
Using Keccak [400] to generate a final response of 128 bits 
takes around 500ns. 
Under these conditions, the resources employed by the 
different modules in a Xilinx Spartan XC3S500E are shown in 
Table I. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
Proposed authentication system offers good cryptographic 
features since their components avoid side channel attacks and 
tampering in key generation, in one side, and reply, dictionary 
and man in the middle attacks in the authentication procedure, 
in the other side. At the same time, the resources employed by 
the system are less than 10% of a Spartan XC3S500E, which 
makes this approach a good candidate for constrained 
resources platforms. The time spent by each extreme is: 
2.88s for nonce generation, 6.26 s to generate the key, 0.5 
s to construct the response, 6.26 s to generate again the key, 
and 0.5 s to calculate the response of the other extreme. This 
makes a total of 16.40 s at each authentication extreme.  
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TABLE I. Occupation of authentication system in a Spartan XC3S500E  
 Slice Flip Flops LUTs Occupation 
Keccak [400] 699 498 1,315 5% 
PUF-TRNG 51 57 97 <1% 







Figure 4. (a) Ring oscillator block. (b) PUF-TRNG module 
